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Handling of Extensible Authentication Protocol Based
Non-Access Stratum Authentication Failures

Abstract:
In a 5G System (5GS), the network initiates and controls the authentication method,
meaning that the network determines whether the user equipment (UE) and the network use EAPbased NAS authentication or 5G AKA-based NAS authentication for the mutual authentication of
the UE and the network. The specification for 5GS presumes that in a 5G standalone case, the UE
supports both EAP-based NAS authentication and 5G AKA-based NAS authentication. However,
not all wireless carriers have required support for EAP-based NAS authentication. As a result,
many UEs manufactured do not support EAP-based NAS authentication.

This publication

describes techniques for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when the network selects an
authentication method (e.g., EAP-based NAS authentication) that the UE does not support.
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Protocol (EAP), non-access stratum (NAS), user equipment (UE), negative acknowledgment
(NAK; NACK), protocol, Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), cellular network, Internet of
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Background:
The 5th Generation (5G) of wireless communication technologies provides for the wide use
of public networks (e.g., cellular networks), non-public networks (e.g., wireless local area network
(WLAN), private networks), and IoT environments by user equipment (UE) devices. In a
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standalone 5G System (5GS), a UE accesses a network, such as a Public Land Mobile Network
(PLMN), through a communication link with a base station (e.g., Evolved NodeB (eNB) node,
Next Generation NodeB (gNB) node) of the network. The base station can act as a serving cell
(serving base station) of the network, and a network may have multiple serving cells (serving base
stations).
After the UE connects with the base station, for example, after completion of a Radio
Resource Control connection setup procedure, the UE initiates registration with the network
utilizing an NAS Attach Procedure. During the NAS Attach Procedure, the UE and the network
utilize a credential-based mutual authentication method for the authentication of the UE and the
network. In some aspects, the credentials are a shared key that both the UE and the network have
access to, such as a SIM-based credential (e.g., Subscriber Identification Module (SIM), Universal
Subscriber Identification Module (USIM), Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC)) utilized by
the 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G AKA) and Extensible Authentication Protocol
Authentication and Key Agreement Prime (EAP-AKA’) protocols.

In other aspects, the

credentials are certificate-based, such as a public key certificate shared between the UE and the
network utilized by the EAP Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) protocol.
In 5GS, the network initiates and controls the authentication method, meaning that the
network determines whether the UE and the network use an EAP-based authentication over 5G
NAS (EAP-based NAS authentication, such as EAP-AKA’ or EAP-TLS) or a 5G AKA-based
authentication over 5G NAS (5G AKA-based NAS authentication, such as 5G AKA) for the
mutual authentication of the UE and the network. The NAS authentication method selected by the
network may vary based on the environment. For example, the same system may use: (a) the EAPTLS protocol for access to non-public (private) networks and IoT environments, (b) the 5G AKA
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protocol for 3GPP access to a 3GPP core network, and (c) the EAP-AKA’ protocol for non-3GPP
access (e.g., Evolution-Data Optimized (EV-DO), wireless local area network (WLAN), WiMAX)
to a 3GPP core network.
The specification for 5GS (e.g., 3GPP TS 24.501 v.16.3.0 (2019-12), section 5.4.1.1)
presumes that in a 5G standalone case, the UE supports both EAP-based NAS authentication and
5G AKA-based NAS authentication. However, not all wireless carriers have required support for
EAP-based NAS authentication. As a result, many UEs manufactured do not support EAP-based
NAS authentication.
Figure 1 illustrates an example in 5GS, where the network selects an authentication method
that the UE does not support.

Figure 1
After the UE connects with the base station, the UE initiates registration with the network
through an NAS Attach Procedure where the UE sends an ATTACH message to the network (not
shown in Figure 1). Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines
the authentication method used by the system and initiates the authentication of the UE by sending
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an Authentication Request message to the UE. For example, the network may send an EAP
Request message to the UE for EAP-based NAS authentication.
In the example of Figure 1, the UE is not configured to support the utilization of EAPbased NAS authentication and cannot decode or encode EAP messages. This occurs when, for
example, the UE has a non-public network SIM card (or an Internet of Things capable (IoTcapable) SIM card) that does not support the EAP protocol over NAS inserted. Upon receiving
the EAP Request message from the network, the UE replies with an Authentication Failure
message. The Authentication Failure message triggers the network to send an Authentication
Reject message to the UE. Upon receiving such an Authentication Reject message, the 5GS
specification directs the UE to regard the SIM-based credential (e.g., SIM, USIM) as invalid for
5GS services and invalid for non-Evolved Packet System (EPS) service. As a result, the UE will
not have access to normal service until after power-cycling the UE or removal of the UICC
containing the SIM-based credential.

Description:
This publication describes techniques for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when
the network selects an authentication method that the UE does not support. One or more of the
techniques described herein may be utilized individually or together.
Figure 2 illustrates a first technique for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when
the network selects an authentication method (e.g., EAP-based NAS authentication) that the UE
does not support.
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Figure 2
After the UE connects with the base station, the UE initiates registration with the network
through an NAS Attach Procedure (e.g., sends an ATTACH message to the network, not shown in
Figure 2). Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines to use an
EAP-based authentication method (e.g., EAP-AKA’) and initiates the authentication of the UE by
sending an EAP Authentication Request message (EAP Request) to the UE for EAP authentication
over 5G NAS.
Upon receiving the EAP Request message from the network, the UE determines if it
supports EAP-based NAS authentication. If the UE cannot handle the EAP protocol, instead of
sending an Authentication Failure message, the UE sends a hard-coded Authentication Response
(EAP Response) message to the network. The hard-coded Authentication Response message
indicates that the UE does not support EAP-based NAS authentication and/or requests the network
to change the authentication method to an alternative authentication protocol (e.g., 5G AKA) if the
network is allowed to do so. The hard-coded Authentication Response (EAP Response) message
may be a negative acknowledgment response (NAK Response) message, when the UE finds the
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desired authentication Type in the EAP Request message unacceptable. In such a NAK Response,
Type zero (0) may be used to indicate that the sender (the UE) has suggested no particular
alternative authentication methods. Other Type values may indicate that the UE suggests one or
more alternative authentication methods (e.g., 5G AKA). The receipt of an Authentication
Response message that includes a hard-coded EAP Response prompts the network to select an
alternative authentication method (e.g., 5G AKA protocol) and send a second Authentication
Request (5G AKA) message to the UE requesting 5G AKA-based NAS authentication.
Figure 3 illustrates a second technique for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when
the network selects an authentication method that the UE does not support.

Figure 3
After the UE connects with the base station, the UE initiates registration with the network
through an NAS Attach Procedure (e.g., sends an ATTACH message to the network, not shown in
Figure 3). Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines to use an
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EAP-based authentication method (e.g., EAP-AKA’, EAP-TLS) and initiates the authentication of
the UE by sending an EAP Authentication Request message (EAP Request) to the UE for EAP
authentication over 5G NAS.
Upon receiving the EAP Request message from the network, the UE determines if it
supports EAP-based NAS authentication. If the UE does not support the EAP protocol, the UE
sends an Authentication Failure message and an Authentication Response message to the network.
The Authentication Failure message triggers the network to send an Authentication Reject message
to the UE. Upon receiving such an Authentication Reject message, the UE does not regard the
SIM-based credential (e.g., SIM) as invalid for 5GS services, nor does the UE regard the USIM as
invalid for non-EPS service. Instead, the UE performs a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)
search with another Radio Access Technology (RAT) in an attempt to find another PLMN/RAT
to perform an NAS Attach procedure with to obtain service that does not require EAP-based NAS
authentication.
Figure 4 illustrates a third technique for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when
a PLMN (network) selects an authentication method that the UE does not support. After the UE
connects with a first cell of a base station of the PLMN, the UE initiates registration with the
network through an NAS Attach Procedure (e.g., sends an ATTACH message to the network, not
shown in Figure 4). Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines
to use an EAP authentication method (e.g., EAP-AKA’, EAP-TLS) and initiates the authentication
of the UE by sending an EAP Authentication Request message (EAP Request) to the UE for EAP
authentication over 5G NAS.
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Figure 4
Upon receiving the EAP Request message from the network, the UE determines if it
supports EAP-based NAS authentication. If the UE cannot handle the EAP protocol, the UE sends
an Authentication Failure message and an Authentication Response message to the network. The
Authentication Failure message triggers the network to send an Authentication Reject message to
the UE. Upon receiving such an Authentication Reject message, the UE does not regard the SIMbased credential (e.g., SIM) as invalid for 5GS services, nor does the UE regard the SIM-based
credential as invalid for non-EPS service. Instead, the UE blocks the first cell of the PLMN and
performs a cell selection procedure that selects a second cell of the PLMN that differs from the
first cell, where the second cell provides service but does not require EAP-based NAS
authentication. By blocking the first cell, the technique prevents camping on a private network or
IoT cell with the same PLMN.
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In a fourth technique for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when a 3GPP core
network selects an authentication method that the UE does not support, after the UE connects with
the base station providing 3GPP access to the network, the UE initiates registration with the
network through an NAS Attach Procedure (e.g., sends an ATTACH message to the network).
Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines to use an EAP
authentication method (e.g., EAP-AKA’, EAP-TLS) and initiates the authentication of the UE by
sending an EAP Authentication Request message (EAP Request) to the UE for EAP authentication
over 5G NAS. Upon receiving the EAP Request message from the network, the UE determines if
it supports EAP-based NAS authentication. If the UE cannot handle the EAP protocol, the UE
sends an Authentication Failure message and an Authentication Response message to the network.
The Authentication Failure message triggers the network to send an Authentication Reject message
to the UE. Upon receiving such an Authentication Reject message, the UE does not regard the
SIM-based credential (e.g., SIM) as invalid for 5GS services, nor does the UE regard the SIMbased credential as invalid for non-EPS service. Instead, the UE performs a cell selection
procedure that selects a second base station providing non-3GPP access to the network that does
not require EAP-based NAS authentication.
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